Tulsa Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 2 2004-2005 Supreme Court Review
Winter 2005

Symposium Foreword
Tim Leonard

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tim Leonard, Symposium Foreword, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 117 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss2/1

This Supreme Court Review Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Leonard: Symposium Foreword

SYMPOSIUM:
2004-2005 SUPREME COURT REVIEW
SYMPOSIUM FOREWORD

The Honorable Tim Leonard*
The University of Tulsa College of Law is to be commended for undertaking, yet
again, a review of the recent Term of the United States Supreme Court. Each year
scholars from the University dissect and analyze the Court's most important and, often
times, controversial decisions. The symposium this year marks, not only the end of this
Term of Court, but also, the end of an era. With the death of Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and the resignation of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the personality and
makeup of the Court will change dramatically.
Chief Justice Rehnquist took the oath of office as an Associate Supreme Court
Justice in 1972 and served fourteen years in that capacity before assuming his new office
of Chief Justice in 1986.1 By serving nineteen years as the Chief Justice, Rehnquist
became the fourth longest serving Chief Justice in the history of the United States, and
the second oldest man to preside over the nation's highest Court. 2 A disciple of judicial
restraint, Rehnquist helped move the Supreme Court in a consistently conservative
direction. While in recent years we have seen the Court express highly divergent legal
views, there is unanimity among members of the Court as to Rehnquist's leadership and
administrative stewardship; his fellow Justices praised him for his consistency and
fairness in preserving harmony in their dealings with one another. 3 Rehnquist's
introduction to the Supreme Court began after law school when he served as a law clerk
for former Justice Robert Jackson. 4 It is interesting to note that one of his former law

* United States District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma.
1. Supreme Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last updated Mar. 6, 2006).

2. See id.
3. U.S. Cts. Off. Pub. Affairs, The Rehnquist Court on their Chief Justice, 37 The Third Branch
(newsletter of the federal courts) (Sept. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/sep05ttb/rehnquist-court/
index.html.
4. S. Ct. Historical Socy., History of the Court: Timeline of the Justices: William H. Rehnquist,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/02-history/subs-timeline/images-chiefs/016.htmi
(accessed Mar. 7,

2006).
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clerks, new Chief Justice John Roberts, is now replacing Rehnquist.
While the replacement of Rehnquist by Roberts may change the Court's overall
philosophy, the greatest potential change in the personality of the Court could occur with
the appointment of a new Justice to replace Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. O'Connor,
more than any other Justice, has been the swing vote in numerous five-to-four decisions.
In the present Term, there are many potential landmark cases in front of the Court
dealing with campaign finance laws, 6 assisted suicide, 7 abortion, 8 the war on terrorism, 9
and other controversial issues 10 that O'Connor could play the decisive role as a pivotal
fifth swing vote. At this time, President George W. Bush has nominated Samuel Alito,
Jr., a judge on the Third United States Circuit Court of Appeals, to fill this vacancy.1 1 It
is anticipated that Judge Alito's confirmation process will be lengthy, divisive, and
politically charged. O'Connor has vowed to remain on the Court until her replacement
has been confirmed; she could, thus, serve only a few months, or throughout the entire
Term. Therefore, some cases could be argued in front of the Court with O'Connor
sitting as a Justice, and with no decision reached prior to her replacement's confirmation.
In that event, it is possible that cases could be re-argued in front of the Court with a new
Justice. With a delicate balance on the Court, the political divisiveness in the country,
the attacks by some members of the legislative branch on the federal judiciary, and the
continual personal and religious issues that are in front of the Court, the next few Terms
could prove tumultuous.
In its 2004 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided eighty cases-seventy-four with
signed opinions, and six per curiam decisions. 12 Sixty-five of those eighty cases were on
certiorari to the federal courts of appeals, thirteen were on certiorari from state courts,
and two were on original jurisdiction. 13 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court in
twenty-two cases, reversed in fifty-four, and with accompanying explanatory opinions
14
dismissed two cases as improvidently granted.

The Court decided nineteen cases by unanimous vote, and in eleven other cases all
participating Justices agreed on the disposition. 15 The Court decided seventeen cases by
a five-to-four majority 16 (including one, Van Orden v. Perry,17 in which there was no
5. S. Ct. Historical Socy., History of the Court: The Current Court: John G. Roberts, Jr.,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/02_history/subs current/images b/001 .html (accessed Mar. 7, 2006).
6. See e.g. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Commn., 126 S. Ct. 1016 (2006); Randall v. Sorrell,
382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005).
7. See e.g. Gonzales v. Or., 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
8. See e.g. Ayotte v. PlannedParenthoodof N. New Eng., 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).
9. See e.g. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005).
10. See e.g. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Instn. Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (addressing the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, which required Department of Defense to deny federal funding
to universities that prohibited military recruiting); Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unido do
Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006) (addressing the interrelationship of the Controlled Substances Act and
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993).
11. Justice Alito was sworn in as a Supreme Court Justice on January 31, 2006.
12. S. Ct., 2004 Term Opinions of the Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/04slipopinion.html
(last updated June 27, 2005) [hereinafter Term Opinions of the Court].
13. Id.
14. Id. The remaining two cases were before the Court on its original jurisdiction.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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majority opinion, and one, United States v. Booker, 18 in which there were two different
five-to-four majorities). For these seventeen decisions, the most common combination
of Justices in the majority was Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens
(occurring three times). 19 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, and Stevens
constituted the majority twice. 20 No other 21combination of Justices in the five-to-four
majority decisions occurred more than once.
Justices O'Connor and Souter appeared most often in the majority of the most
narrowly decided cases, and Justices Ginsburg and Stevens least often. 22 Justice
Kennedy wrote the most majority opinions in this group, five, followed by Justice
Souter, four. 23 In the last Term, Justice Breyer cast the fewest dissenting votes in
opinions by his colleagues, ten. 24 Justice Thomas was by far the most frequent dissenter,
casting twenty dissenting votes and writing the largest number of dissents, fourteen. 25 In
terms of voting alignments, the Ginsburg-Souter match up continues with a high degree
26
of agreement, as does the Scalia-Thomas alignment.
Perhaps the case having the most impact on the federal judiciary, and the one
which will in all likelihood be revisited in the future by the High Court, and even by
Congress, is United States v. Booker,27 in which the United States Sentencing Guidelines
were determined to violate, in certain respects, the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury. 28 This case resulted in the unusual situation of two separate five-to-four majority
opinions, with Justice Ginsburg joining Justice Stevens's majority opinion in declaring
the Guidelines unconstitutional, 29 but also joining Justice Breyer's majority opinion with
respect to the remedy. 30 Justice Breyer's opinion declared the Guidelines to be advisory
and only one of the factors a sentencing court must consider under title 18, section 3553
of the United States Code in fashioning a reasonable sentence. 3 1 As a result of this case,
district courts and circuit courts have reached differing conclusions as to the impact of
the Guidelines on sentencing. 32 Under the mandatory Guidelines, the burden of proof
17. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
18. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
19. Term Opinions of the Court, supra n. 12.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Term Opinions of the Court, supra n. 12.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
28. For an additional discussion of UnitedStates v. Booker, see Carol A. Pettit, Student Author, Writing the
Book[er] on Blakely: The Challenge to the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 365 (2005).
29. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 745-46 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part, Scalia, Souter,
Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
30. Id. at 756 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part, O'Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ. &
Rehnquist, C.J., joining).
31. Id. at 756-57.
32. See e.g. U.S. v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005) (declining to fashion a per se rule as to
reasonableness); U.S. v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding Guideline sentence is presumptively
reasonable); U.S. v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass. 2005) (holding individualized determination of
weight to be given to Guidelines); U.S. v. Coney, 390 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 n. 15 (D. Neb. 2005) (holding
preponderance of the evidence standard applies after Booker); U.S. v. Okai, 2005 WL 2042301 at * 10 (D. Neb.
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placed on the government was preponderance of the evidence with respect to factors a
judge might use to enhance a sentence. 33 Many now believe that the Booker decision
requires a higher burden, and some believe that only a finding by a jury may be used to
enhance a sentence. The great majority of courts are still requiring a preponderance of
the evidence in determining the appropriate Guideline. sentencing range. While some
judges now view the advisory nature of the Guidelines as allowing them much wider
discretion in sentencing, others are treating the Guidelines with almost the same
deference they were given while still mandatory.
Sentencing within the Guideline range has remained fairly stable, with some
decline in the percentage of cases outside that range. 34 Prior to the Booker decision,
approximately 69% of sentences were within the Guideline range; while post-Booker,
approximately 62% of sentences are within the determined Guideline range. 35 The great
majority of departures from the sentencing range (approximately 24%) are a result of a
government motion for downward departure for cooperation or other substantial
36
reasons.
Prior to the Booker decision, there was concern by some in Congress that the
courts were ignoring the sentencing mandates set forth in the Congressional legislation,
and after the Booker decision, there is even greater concern and calls by some in
Congress to increase the number of mandatory minimum sentences which would allow
the courts little or no discretion in sentencing. After the Court had issued its ruling in
Blakely v. Washington,3 7 which struck down a state guideline system in the state of
Washington, many defendants preserved their right to appeal their sentence under the
Federal Guidelines, anticipating that the Court would later strike down the Guidelines as
unconstitutional, as it did in Booker.
There is a split among the circuits as to the retroactivity of Booker, and it is
anticipated there will be a continuing split over what "reasonableness" means in
determining a sentence, as well as the procedures to follow by the sentencing court and
the burden of proof required for the enhancement of sentences. While some defendants
have been remanded back to the district court for re-sentencing as a result of Booker,
there has not been the flood of re-sentencings that the district courts feared, as many of
the sentences have been upheld even though they were sentenced under the mandatory
Guidelines. Certainly, the confusion caused by these two majority opinions will create
more litigation, which the Supreme Court will ultimately have to decide in the upcoming
Term, or a future Term.
Two other cases relating to constitutional law discussed in this symposium are
Gonzalez v. Raich,38 analyzed by Professor Steven Balman,3 9 and Illinois v. Caballes,40

Aug. 22, 2005) (mem.) (holding beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies after Booker); U.S. v. Wilson, 350
F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005) (holding Guidelines entitled to "heavy" weight).
33. SeeBooker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
34. U.S. Senten. Commn., Special Post-Booker Coding Project 7-11, www.ussc.gov/blakely/postbooker_
101305.pdf (Oct. 13, 2005).
35. Id. at 7.
36. Id.
37. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
38. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
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reviewed by Professor Chris Blair. 4 1 The Raich case was a six-to-three ruling 42 that held
people who smoke marijuana because their doctors recommend it to ease pain can be
prosecuted for violating federal drug laws. While Justice Stevens, in writing for the
Court, held that the ruling was not passing judgment on the potential medical benefits of
marijuana, 43 he did hold that the Constitution allows federal regulation of homegrown
44
marijuana as interstate commerce.
In the Caballes case, in a six-to-two opinion, 45 the Justices ruled that drug-sniffing
dogs could be used to check out motorists even if officers have no reason to suspect they
may be carrying narcotics. Caballes was stopped by Illinois police for driving faster than
the speed limit, and a drug-sniffing dog found $250,000 worth of marijuana in the trunk
of the car. 4 6 The Court held "a dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic
stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual
has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.'A7 The analysis of the
Court in the Caballes case could have sweeping implications on the privacy rights of
individuals as new technologies are invented, such as x-ray devices and other sensory
methods that are designed to detect illegal items.
This Term, the Court revisited three important death penalty issues. One of the
most controversial was Roper v. Simmons, 48 which held that the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause bars executing people who committed crimes
when they were younger than eighteen years of age. The Court had rejected this position
in 1989, 49 but a bare majority stated that the "standards of decency" had evolved over
the past sixteen years to the point where such punishment was no longer constitutionally
51
This was in keeping with the Court's reasoning in Atkins v. Virginia,
acceptable.
where the Court made a similar holding as it related to mentally retarded defendants.
Roper was controversial because Justice Scalia denounced the notion that the Eighth
Amendment's dictates evolve as society's values do.52 He also criticized the majority's
reference to international law. 53 This created a continuing furor over whether the Court
should rely on international law, and has even resulted in a resolution passed in Congress
that discourages the U.S. Supreme Court's use of foreign law to interpret United States
law. 54 In Medellin v. Dretke,55 the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted,

39. Steven K. Balman, Constitutional Irony: Gonzales v. Raich, Federalism and CongressionalRegulation
of IntrastateActivities under the Commerce Clause, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 125 (2005).
40. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
41. Chris Blair, Illinois v. Caballes: Love Affair with a Drug-Sniffing Dog, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 179 (2005).
42. 125 S. Ct. at 2198.
43. See id.
at 2211-12.
44. Id.at2215.
45. 543 U.S. at405.
46. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203-04 (11. 2003); see Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406-07.
47. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
48. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
49. See Stanfordv. Ky., 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
50. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551,578-79.
51. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
52. Roper, 543 U.S. at 607-08.
53. Id. at 622-28.
54. H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005).
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as discussed further by Professor Janet Levit in her article. 56 The Medellin case dealt
with foreign national capital defendants who were not advised prior to trial of their right
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to consult with their nations'
consulates.
In another decision that is going to greatly increase litigation, the Justices in Smith
v. City of Jackson,57 expanded job protection for roughly half the nation's work force,
ruling that federal law allows people age forty and older to file age bias claims over
salary and hiring, even if employers never intended any harm. 58 The Court made clear
that employers may still prevail if they can cite a reasonable explanation for their
policies, such as cost-cutting. 59 Again, what is reasonable and what is unreasonable will
have to be decided on a case-by-case basis without much guidance from the Court. In
one case which, in effect, overturned Tenth Circuit law, the Supreme Court eased access
to the federal courts. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services Inc.,60 the Court in a
five-to-four opinion held that as long as at least one named plaintiff satisfies the amount
in controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction, the court has supplemental
jurisdiction over other plaintiffs' claims arising from the same dispute. 6 1 Therefore, one
can assume that courts in the Tenth Circuit will see more class action lawsuits in the
future. In addition, Congress has passed legislation that will allow more class action
62
lawsuits to be tried in federal court.
Professor Maria Mansfield analyzes several cases involving the taking of private
property. 63 In the highly controversial Kelo v. City of New London,64 the Court allowed
the City to condemn certain property, even though it was not located in a blighted
neighborhood, for the use of an economic development project that included a hotel and
conference center, marinas, retail stores, restaurants, and research and development
space. 65 The owners of the property taken sued, claiming that the condemnation was not
for public use under the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause and was therefore
unconstitutional. 66 The property owners had argued that economic development did not
qualify as a public use. 67 In San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco,6 8 the Justices in a
unanimous ruling decided that people who lose state claims that the government had

55. 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005).
56. Janet Koven Levit, Medellin v. Dretke: Another Chapter in the Vienna Convention Narrative,41 Tulsa
L. Rev. 193 (2005).
57. 125 S.Ct. 1536 (2005).
58. See id. For a discussion of Smith v. City of Jackson and the other business related cases of the
2004-2005 Supreme Court Term, see Barbara K. Bucholtz, DestabilizedDoctrine at the end of the Rehnquist
Era and the Business Related Cases in Its Final Term, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 219 (2005).
59. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1555.
60. 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
61. Id. at 2615.
62. Class Action FairnessAct of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
63. Maria E. Mansfield, Takings and Threes: The Supreme Court's 2004-2005 Term, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 243
(2005).
64. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
65. Id. at 2659.
66. Id. at 2660.
67. Id.
68. 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005).
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improperly taken their property cannot count on federal courts for help. In another
unanimous opinion, Lingle v. Chevron, US.A., 69 the Justices held that Hawaii did not
overstep its authority when it moved to keep gasoline prices in line by imposing caps on
rent paid by dealer-run stations. Chevron argued that the Hawaii law was an
unconstitutional "taking" of the company's profits because it failed to "substantially
advance" 70 the state's goal of lowering retail gasoline prices. The Court rejected this
argument.
7
71
Professor Gary Allison comments on one Oklahoma case, Clingman v. Beaver.7 2
In this six-to-three ruling, the Justices held that states may bar political parties from
opening their primary elections to members of other parties, 73 thereby upholding the
restrictions in some twenty-four states. In Clingman, the Justices ruled against the
74
Libertarian Party in its First Amendment challenge to Oklahoma's primary system.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, said that states had broad powers to structure
Party's rights of free association were not
primaries as they see fit, and the Libertarian
75
system.
primary
Oklahoma's
violated by
Professor William Rice discusses another case from Oklahoma, 76 Cherokee Nation
of Oklahoma v. Leavitt,77 concerning Indian tribes and contracts. In this case, the Court
resolved a split among the circuits, reversing the Tenth Circuit.
In conclusion, the last Rehnquist Court continued along the path that it has taken
the last several Terms-hearing fewer cases overall, but focusing more on specific types
of cases, such as death penalty and states' rights, versus federalism issues. While many
of the decisions were controversial and narrowly decided, most followed the trend of the
Court's prior decisions of earlier Terms. While most litigants in recent years have
fashioned their arguments to appeal to the swing votes on the Court, it remains to be seen
if the makeup of the new Court will be similarly divided. As the new Roberts Court
emerges, the docket is already crowded with highly controversial and difficult issues. In
addition, cases decided by the last Rehnquist Court-such as the separation of church
and state, and sentencing issues-will in all likelihood be shortly revisited. Of course,
Congress is already reacting to some of the Court's recent decisions, such as the Kelo
case, by introducing legislation regarding eminent domain; 78 other legislation relating to
habeas proceedings and sentencing issues will no doubt follow. It is therefore assured
that the next symposium hosted by The University of Tulsa College of Law will prove
equally interesting and provocative.

69. 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
70. Id. at passim.
71. Gary D. Allison, Protecting Our Nation's PoliticalDuopoly: The Supremes Spoil the Libertarians'
Party, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 291 (2005).
72. 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005).
73. Id.at 2042.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. G. William Rice, Federal Indian Law Cases in the Supreme Court's 2004-2005 Term, 41 Tulsa L.
Rev. 341 (2005).
77. 125 S. Ct. 1172 (2005).
78. Eminent Domain Limitation Act of 2005, H.R. 3631, 109th Cong. (2005).
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